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Advances in competition economics as well as in computational and empirical 
methods have offered the scope for the employment of merger simulation mod-
els in merger control procedures during the past almost 15 years. Merger simu-
lation is, nevertheless, still a very young and innovative instrument of antitrust 
and, therefore, its ‘technical’ potential is far from being comprehensively ex-
ploited and teething problems in its practical use in the antitrust environment 
prevail. We provide a classification of state-of-the-art merger simulation mod-
els and review their previous employment in merger cases as well as the prob-
lems and limitations currently associated with their use in merger control. In 
summary, merger simulation models represent an important and valuable exten-
sion of the toolbox of merger policy. However, they do not qualify as a magic 
bullet and must be combined with other, more traditional instruments of compe-
tition policy in order to comprehensively unfold its beneficial effects. 
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1.  Introduction 
The computational simulation of welfare effects of real-world (proposed) hori-
zontal mergers in oligopolistic markets has become an increasingly important 
instrument of competition policy since the mid-1990s, both in the U.S. and in 
the EU. Merger simulation models (MSM) have been employed both by anti-
trust authorities and merging companies as well as by courts in order to assess 
the pro- or anticompetitive character of proposed mergers. Despite some set-
backs, it seems likely that the merger policy tool ‘simulation models’ will play 
an even more important role in the future. In general, every “[m]erger simula-
tion uses a standard oligopoly model calibrated to observed prices and quanti-
ties to predict the effects of a merger on the prices and quantities of the merging 
firms and their rivals” (Froeb & Werden 2000: 134). It aims at giving numerical 
predictions of price and quantity changes and, in doing so, constitutes a consid-
erable departure from the more traditional structural merger analysis mainly 
based on changes in market shares and concentration ratios. 
 
The reasons for the increased popularity of MSM in antitrust practice are mani-
fold (Baker & Rubinfeld 1999: 386-387). Firstly, progress in industrial econom-
ics has revealed new types of anticompetitive effects of mergers in oligopolies 
(in particular unilateral effects theory and auction theory), while, at the same 
time, emphasizing the importance of explicitly recognizing pro-competitive ef-
fects of mergers (e.g. efficiency gains). An assessment of these effects requires 
a detailed analysis of the actual welfare effects of a specific merger proposal. 
Secondly, progress in methods and computation techniques has allowed for in-
creasingly complex simulations, based upon real-world data. Thirdly, the same 
technological progress has increased the availability of market data (such as 
prices and quantities, allowing for the empirical estimation of elasticities). In 
particular, data from scanner cashpoints must be mentioned in this context. 
Fourthly, competition policy has increasingly embraced (industrial) economic 
theory and economic instruments. In the course of the so-called Post-Chicago 
Antitrust Economics in the U.S. (since the early 1990s) (Brodley 1995; Baker  
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1999a) and the so-called More-Economic Approach in the EU (since the early 
2000s) (EAGCP 2005; Röller 2005; Neven 2006), the two most important anti-
trust regimes in the world have become more receptive of innovative economic 
assessment instruments and, moreover, contributed to their development by ac-
tively demanding a more sophisticated economic input. 
 
Against the background of the increasing importance of MSM, we provide a 
survey on MSM and their employment in merger policy that serves two goals: 
(i) providing an overview on the working mechanisms of this new tool and (ii) 
reviewing its performance in practical antitrust so far. After Section 2 intro-
duces the basic features of MSM, section 3 reviews the mainstream of the cur-
rently available simulation techniques and approaches. Then, section 4 surveys 
the major antitrust cases in which merger simulations have been employed and, 
in doing so, identifies existing limitations and problems of MSM as a policy in-
strument. Finally, section 5 provides a conclusion. 
2.  An Introductory Guide to Merger Simulation 
2.1.   Oligopoly Theory 
Modern, game-theoretic oligopoly theory is predominantly built upon three 
standard models.
1 Cournot-competition (quantity competition), Bertrand-
competition (price competition) and auction theory. While theory additionally 
explores on alternative oligopoly models (including the quasi-oligopolistic 
models of monopolistic competition), antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers 
has recently focused on these three basic types whenever oligopolistic market 
                                                            
1   We focus on mergers in oligopolistic markets since this is where modern theory yields new insights 
and considerably influences merger control. Mergers to monopoly or clear single-firm dominance are 
better understood and not subject to current research in the same extent. Furthermore, we restrict our 
survey to horizontal mergers since this is the area in which merger simulation has exclusively been 
applied up to date.  
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structures have been identified (Kaplow & Shapiro 2007; Froeb & Werden 
2008; Kerber & Schwalbe 2008).  
 
In general, there is a widespread consensus that Cournot models are most ade-
quate if products are rather homogeneous, i.e. costumers have no (or insignifi-
cant) preferences for specific suppliers of the product (so that the products are 
perfect substitutes). Examples include markets for natural resources, like crude 
oil, or vitamins, electricity, etc. In such markets, suppliers experience strong in-
centives to either vigorously compete with each other or to tacitly collude and, 
in a coordinated way, drive the price above the competitive level. In rather nar-
row homogeneous oligopolies, mergers tend to increase the probability of the 
collusive equilibrium because the reduction in the number of players facilitates 
tacit coordination. As homogeneous markets tend to endorse the rule of one 
price, competition via quantities (Cournot competition) is viewed to be an ap-
propriate model, in particular with respect to the collusion effect (so-called ‘co-
ordinated effects theory’; Kühn 2008). 
 
Things are different in markets for heterogeneous (differentiated) goods where 
customers have considerable preferences, for instance for brands or specific 
goods characteristics, like in most markets for consumers goods. If customers 
enjoy preferences, they no longer view the competing products to be perfect 
substitutes anymore. Instead, competitors in heterogeneous markets supply im-
perfect substitutes. This involves several important implications that complicate 
analysis. For instance, the rule of one price does not apply since costumers are 
willing to pay a bit more for the preferred product compared to the competing 
ones. Secondly, if one competitor increases its price, some costumers (but not 
all) will switch to another supplier, however, they will distribute unevenly 
among the competitors. In other words, the degree of substitution, the cross-
price elasticity, among the differentiated products differs and thus matters. Two 
firms in a heterogeneous oligopoly can be close competitors (i.e. their products 
are close substitutes) or more distant competitors. As a consequence, mergers in 
heterogeneous oligopolies offer scope for the merged entity to increase prices  
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for its products since a certain share of costumers of merging company A will 
view the product of merging company B as the best alternative and thus react to 
an increase of priceA by switching to productB. While company A finds a price 
increase unprofitable in the pre-merger equilibrium, it might find it profitable 
post-merger since it now controls the best alternative for some of its customers. 
The assessment of mergers becomes more complex as the effect of a merger 
depends on the cross-price elasticities, i.e. it matters who merges with whom. 
Generally, the anticompetitive effect of a merger increases with an increasing 
cross-price elasticity between the products of the merging companies, i.e. a 
merger between product-differentiated firms is more harmful if close substitutes 
are involved (compared to more distant substitutes). This puts the importance of 
market shares into perspective: a merger of close substitutes leading to a com-
paratively small combined market share might be more harmful than a merger 
between distant substitutes leading to a significantly higher combined market 
share. The effect of the merged entity experiencing a certain scope for increas-
ing prices is usually called unilateral effects theory (because neither tacit nor 
explicit coordination among the oligopolists is required). Unilateral effects are 
predominantly ascribed to heterogeneous markets and Bertrand competition
2 
(price competition) is the preferred model to appropriately picture these effects. 
 
Thus there is a widespread consensus that Bertrand competition is the first 
choice for heterogeneous oligopolies whereas Cournot competition is the first 
choice for more homogeneous oligopolies (Kaplow & Shapiro 2007; Froeb & 
Werden 2008). The pro- or anticompetitive effects of mergers in homogeneous 
Cournot-oligopolies predominantly depend on present (in contrast to future) 
market characteristics, with market shares representing a meaningful indicator, 
as well as on the former interaction of the suppliers, in particular the pre-merger 
degree of interfirm coordination or collusion. In other words, the analysis of the 
                                                            
2   Note that analyzing Bertrand competition with heterogeneous products departs from the standard 
textbook case where Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods leads to the same results as per-
fect competition (the original Bertrand (1888) result). Price competition with heterogeneous goods, in 
contrast, generally leads to prices above the competitive level.  
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hitherto development of the relevant market is of paramount importance. There-
fore, empirical methods that estimate past market structure and behaviour rep-
resent the generally employed quantitative economic techniques (domain of 
econometrics). Demand is important regarding the own-price elasticity, whereas 
cross-price elasticities usually do not play a considerable role (perfect or near-
perfect substitutes). In contrast, on heterogeneous markets, demand becomes 
the decisive aspect, in particular the probable reaction of customers to a unilat-
eral post-merger price increase by the merged entity. Therefore, predictive 
analysis, in particular the accurate estimation of demand and cross-price elastic-
ities, becomes more important: the focus is on predicting the behaviour of cus-
tomers, i.e. predicting prices and quantities in the post-merger equilibrium. 
Thus, unilateral effects cases represent one domain of merger simulation. 
 
In some markets, products are traded in a way reminding of auctions. Next to 
suppliers that actually auction their products, for instance, markets for products 
that are sold on a rather low-frequent basis and, moreover, include elements tai-
lormade for the individual customer often possess the following or similar cha-
racteristics; customers call for tenders, thereby specifying their particular needs. 
Suppliers then submit tenders and a multiple-round selection procedure even-
tually leads to a transaction. Examples include markets for business software, 
user specific technical equipment (e.g. mining) or services for the public sector 
like forest timber service or hospitals,
3 etc. If mergers occur on such kind of 
markets, auction models represent the first choice to simulate the competitive 
effects (Klemperer 2008). 
2.2.  Simulating Mergers 
As already seen above, the various effects a merger might cause high depend-
ence on the characteristics of the underlying market. Hence a variety of merger 
                                                            
3   In the U.S., hospitals bid for long-term contracts with so-called Preferred Provider Organizations 
(PPO) which provide individual health insurance. PPO insurants are obliged to go hospitals with such 
contracts in case of illness (Dalkir et al. 2000).  
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simulation models evolved. However, most merger simulations are based upon 
common basic assumptions and, generally,
4 can be described in roughly the 
same way as a multiple-step process (inter alia Crooke et al. 1999: 208-209; 
Kokkoris 2005: 330-331). First, a functional form of demand that matches con-
sumer behaviour in the best possible way has to be chosen. Frequently proposed 
models are linear, log-linear, logit, AIDS (Almost Ideal Demand System) or 
multiple-step demand (see section 3). Based on the assumed demand function, 
cross-price and own-price elasticities can be estimated or empirically deducted. 
This first part of the simulation process is usually called “front-end” analysis 
(Werden 1997: 97). The second step consists of calibration of the demand sys-
tems meaning that the parameters are specified in a way so that the calculated 
elasticities yield the prices and market shares actually observed in the pre-
merger market. Third, the supply side is modelled by assuming an oligopoly 
model that most closely describes the competition between firms in the market. 
In many cases, Bertrand competition is the first choice, because it allows infer-
ring marginal costs describing the production process directly from the first-
order conditions for profit maximization. Using the information on marginal 
costs a complete empirical model of the pre-merger market can be calibrated. 
Fourth, in a final step, the new equilibrium after the merger can be simulated 
using the model that was calibrated with pre-merger empirical data, but adjust-
ing market shares to the post-merger situation. In doing so, one implicitly as-
sumes that all firms behave non-cooperatively and that the form of competition, 
the demand system and the functional form of marginal cost do not change due 
to the merger. The only change that is implemented concerns the merging par-
ties – the competition between them is internalized (Kokkoris 2005: 332). The 
second part of the simulation process including calibration of the demand and 
supply side as well as the simulation itself is usually called the “back-end” 
analysis (Werden 1997: 97).  
 
                                                            
4   Simulations via auction models might differ regarding their functioning in various points from the 
other forms.   
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The above-outlined description only holds in absence of efficiency gains and 
reactions of competitors. However, mergers might increase the productive effi-
ciency, leading to a reduction in variable costs. Hence, the possibility of im-
proved efficiency needs to be checked and, eventually, post-merger marginal 
costs must be adapted (Crooke et al. 1999: 209). Furthermore, reactions of rival 
firms like product repositioning, market entry or exist must be considered. Yet, 
their formal inclusion into the simulation process is difficult and cannot be gen-
eralised (Budzinski & Christiansen 2007a). 
3.  Types of Merger Simulation Models 
3.1.  Towards a Classification Scheme 
An comprehensive classification of the various MSM currently in use can rarely 
be found. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, only Bergeijk and Klooster-
huis (2005: 6) suggest a differentiation between six forms of models currently 
in use: logit models, auction models, Bertrand models, Cournot models, 
econometric models and supply function models. This classification, however, 
causes some confusion since the two categories logit and Bertrand models are 
not mutually exclusive. Instead, most Bertrand models use a logit model to es-
timate the demand side of the model. Most other authors rather concentrate on 
models based on a certain form of competition and differentiate them according 
to the assumed form of demand. Goppelsröder and Schinkel (2005: 56), for ex-
ample, distinguish only between simulation methods using an econometrically 
estimated demand model and methods assuming an appropriate functional form 
of demand.  
 
We propose an alternative two-stage classification of MSM based on different 
criteria. Crooke et al. (1999: 206) stated that a merger simulation is based on 
three key assumptions: the chosen form of competitive interaction, the shape of 
marginal cost curves and the demand system in the market. While marginal 
costs are generally assumed to be invariant in the relevant range for merger  
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analysis, several forms of competition and various functional systems of de-
mand are used to develop MSM. Therefore, a classification according to the as-
sumed form of competition and system of demand seems appropriate and more 
consistent.  
 
At the first stage, models are classified according to the assumed form of com-
petition that best describes the market. Bertrand models, auction models as well 
as Cournot and supply function models are identified as three different types of 
models. On the second level of classification the most commonly used model 
type – the Bertrand model – is split up with respect to the chosen demand sys-
tem. As explored in section 2.1, the demand system entails a specific impor-
tance in case of heterogeneous price competition, whereas quantity competition 
is predominantly used for more homogeneous markets where other factors drive 
the welfare effects. With regard to the demand specification currently in use, 
the following subtypes can be identified: linear and log-linear demand models, 
discrete choice demand models, AIDS and PCAIDS models as well as multi-
level demand estimation. Figure 1 illustrates the described classification 
scheme. 
 
































form of demand  
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3.2. Bertrand  Models 
The following models differ with respect to the chosen demand form but share 
the same basic assumptions of the Bertrand model.
 In particular, market entry 
shall not occur even in the case of a price rise. Marginal costs are supposed to 
be constant over the relevant range of output (see for example Hausman & 
Leonard 1997: 321). The marginal costs that are needed to calibrate the supply 
side of a simulation model are recovered in a similar way for all following 
models by using first-order conditions of profit maximization (for a formal rep-
resentation see for example Werden 1997: 98-99). In order to solve these first-
order conditions for marginal costs, information on prices and quantities as well 
as on own- and cross-price demand elasticities is needed. The latter have to be 
discovered using one of the subsequently described demand forms. The deci-
sion for a certain demand system is of crucial importance, as each demand sys-
tem is characterized by specific curvature properties that significantly influence 
the simulation outcome (e.g. Lundmark & Nilsson 2003: 114).
5 Everything else 
held equal, the log-linear demand predicts the greatest price increase, followed 
by AIDS, whereas logit and linear demand yield significantly lower price in-
creases (Crooke et al. 1999: 205ff). 
Linear and Log-linear Demand Models 
The simplest models of demand are linear or log-linear functions. They both 
have the attractive property of constant own- and cross-price elasticities of de-
mand that can be incorporated in a regression equation as coefficients (Werden 
1997: 99). Equations (1) and (2) show general representations of linear and log-
linear demand, respectively, with  k z  being a vector of demand shift variables, q 
being quantities and p prices: 
 
                                                            
5   This is because mergers most likely have significant effects on competition. Therefore, a substantial 
movement along the demand curve away from pre-merger equilibrium must be expected (Crooke et 
al. 1999: 206).   
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(1)  ∑ ∑ + + =
jk
k ik j ij i i z p b a q γ  
(2)  k
jk
ik j ij i i z p q ∑∑ + + = γ β α log log  
 
The linear demand model makes predictions of the price effects of a merger 
most convenient, because it allows solving the problem analytically rather than 
numerically (Werden 1997: 99).
6 The assumption of constant elasticities of de-
mand, however, receives considerable criticism. It seems unrealistic that while 
a merger changes prices and market shares in a significant way, it does not 
change demand elasticities at all (Werden 1997: 99). Instead, own and cross-
price elasticities of a product are expected to change with the level of prices. 
Moreover, the assumption of linear demand is generally criticized as an inade-
quate approximation of actual demand behaviour (Werden 1997: 100). It often 
results in the prediction of negative quantities for highly asymmetric mergers 
unless one imposes non-negativity constraints (Crooke et al. 1999: 209). In 
some cases, a log-linear demand system does not even provide a post-merger 
equilibrium at all (Crooke et al. 1999: 210). As a result, linear and log-linear 
models are scarcely used. If applied, the resulting price increases of a merger 
are to be interpreted only as rough indicators of a possible effect.  
Discrete Choice Demand Models 
Discrete choice models are commonly used to obtain the demand structure of 
differentiated products markets when market-level data on quantities, prices and 
other product characteristics is available. It is a tractable and parsimonious 
method based on parametric restrictions of the demand structure (see Berry 
1994: 244). The general idea of discrete-choice demand emanates from the as-
sumption of a consumer utility function depending on observable product char-
acteristics, including price, and unobservable product characteristics as well as 
                                                            
6   For a formal representation, see Werden et al. (1996: 99-100) and Hausman et al. (1994: 173-174).  
17 
individual-specific coefficients.
7 Consumers will choose to buy a unit of the 
product that maximizes their personal utility function.  
 
In almost all discrete-choice models, an outside good or option is specified rep-
resenting the possibility that a consumer may decide not to choose any of the 
available products (see inter alia Berry 1994: 245ff; Nevo 2000a: 400-401). 
Without the definition of an outside good a general increase in price would 
have no influence on total demand - a contradiction to microeconomic theory. 
The problem resulting from the inclusion of the outside option is that market 
shares can no longer be calculated directly from quantities observed. Berry 
(1994: 247) and Berry et al. (1995: 845-846) propose to set the potential market 
size equal to the number of households or to estimate it using aggregate market-
level data.  
 
The choice of a functional form and the distribution of consumer specific terms 
that influence utility designate the type of discrete choice model (Berry 1994: 
245). In the past few years a variety of models has come into use for merger 
analysis. The most popular one is the simple logit demand or Antitrust Logit 
Model (ALM). Besides, nested logit and random coefficients models can be 
frequently found. Complexity and computational efforts rise while approxima-
tion becomes more realistic from ALM over nested logit to random coefficients 
models. A restrictive property of all discrete choice models is that only one out 
of a finite number of products is chosen only one time in the considered time 
period. In some industries, especially for day-to-day products, this does not rep-
resent actual consumer behaviour (Nevo 2000a: 401). 
Logit Demand Models 
Formal delineations for logit demand models can be found in numerous papers 
(e.g. Berry 1994: 245ff; Berry et al. 1995: 845ff; Werden et al. 1996: 85ff). It is 
                                                            
7   If consumer-specific coefficients are to be considered, data on individual characteristics has to be 
available.   
18 
assumed that there are N  firms in a certain market with each firm producing 
one product. The utility  ) , , , , ( θ ν ξ j j j i x p U  which a consumer i derives from prod-
uct j of firm j ( N j∈ ) is denoted as a random utility-function, linear in parame-
ters of observed product characteristics  j x , unobservable attributes  i ξ , price  j p  
and demand parameters θ. The term  i ν  captures consumer specific terms not 
observed by the econometrician. If it is furthermore assumed that there is only 
one consumer-specific taste parameter  ij ε , the utility function can be written as:  
 
(3)    ) , , , , ( ij j ij j j j j j j i p x p U ε δ ε ξ α β θ ν ξ + ≡ + + − ≡ x  
  j j j j p ξ α β δ + − = x  
 
In this case variation in consumer tastes enters the model only through  ij ε  while 
j ξ  can be interpreted as the mean of consumers’ valuations of an unobserved 
product characteristic like quality and  j δ  is the mean utility level of product j. If 
ij ε  is furthermore assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) 
across consumers and products with the “extreme value” distribution function 
)) exp( exp( ε − − , then the market share of product j, representing its choice prob-


























If there exists an outside option 0 of not buying any of the products in the mar-
ket and its mean utility is normalized to zero, it follows that: 
 
(5)  j j j j j p s s ξ α β δ + − ≡ = − x ) ln( ) ln( 0  
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and  j δ  is identified directly from algebraic calculation including market shares 
that can be estimated using simple instrumental variables regression on differ-
ences in log market shares on ( j j p x , ) (Berry 1994: 250).
8 
 
The own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand for a particular good,  jj η  
and  jk η , can be calculated using the estimated parameter α , observed prices  j p  
and market shares  j s  as well as the aggregate elasticity of demand η that can be 
inferred from the estimated parameters. In detail: 
 
(6)  ) 1 ( j j jj s p − − = α η  
(7)  k k jk s p α η =  
(8)  0 s p α η =  
9
   
 
It follows that the logit model consists of only two demand parameters: the ag-
gregate elasticity of demand η, which controls for substitutability between the 
products in the market and the outside good, and α , which controls for substitu-
tion among the “inside the market” products (Werden 1997: 101). The demand 
system of the simulation model can finally be calibrated by solving the logit 
probability functions for  β j x  after setting  β 0 x  to arbitrary values (Werden 1997: 
101). 
 
The described logit model is estimated using Maximum Likelihood (see for ex-
ample Ben-Akiva & Lerman 1991: 118ff). Emphasis must be put on possible 
endogeneity problems concerning prices and other product characteristics. By 
allowing this problem, an instrumental variables approach can be used. In gen-
eral, the use of logit models is supported by industrial economists with refer-
ence to its computational simplicity and little information requirements (Wer-
                                                            
8   Demand-side instrumental variables should ideally be variables that shift costs but are uncorrelated 
with the demand side. See Nevo (2000b: 532ff) for a detailed summary of possible instruments. 
9   p : share-weighted average pre-merger price of all goods.  
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den & Froeb 1994: 421; Werden et al. 1996: 83). Logit models offer at least 
rough estimates of merger price effects, what justifies its usage in cases with no 
priors about individual preferences or where preferences cannot be examined 
empirically. Finally, no matter how rough logit estimations may be, they are 
still considered as a “quantum leap beyond traditional antitrust analysis” (Wer-
den et al. 1996: 84, 89). 
 
The greatest limitation of logit specification is due to its restrictive assumption 
of “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)” (Ben-Akiva & Lerman 1991: 
108-111).
10 The IIA property states that the ratio of choice probabilities of any 
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This implies that a consumer’s switch to other products in reaction of a price 
increase for one product is proportionally to the relative shares of these prod-
ucts. The IIA property greatly facilitates estimation, because the model can be 
estimated using only a limited subset of the full choice set. Moreover, it enables 
to forecast, for example, the demand for a new product. Nevertheless, it is unre-
alistic in the majority of merger cases (Hausman & McFadden 1984: 1222). In 
many real markets, consumers do not view all other products as equally substi-
tutable (Werden & Froeb 1994: 420). If a logit model is nevertheless applied to 
a market with differentiated products, its data fit should be checked by a test of 
the IIA assumption (Hausman & McFadden 1984).  
                                                            
10   The IIA property follows from several assumptions of the logit model from which the mutual inde-
pendence of the  ij ε  is seen as the crucial one (Ben-Akiva & Lerman 1991: 109).  
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Nested Logit Models 
The nested logit model is a generalization of the simple multinomial logit 
model which was developed to overcome the problem of IIA. In order to ac-
count for different levels of substitutability, the  ij ε  are separated into an identi-
cally and independently distributed shock component and a nest-specific com-
ponent which is allowed to be correlated across products that are grouped into 
one of the multiple predetermined exhaustive and exclusive nests. In most pa-
pers (see for example Werden & Froeb 1994: 412), one nest is defined which 
divides the choice set into two subsets: one for the outside good and another for 
the inside goods. Furthermore, the inside goods can be grouped into different 
nests on a second hierarchical level. Computational effort increases with the 
number of nests to be considered. The result of the nesting structure is that sub-
stitution across groups is smaller than within. Within the nests, however, the 
IIA property continues to hold (Nevo 2000b: 523ff). Hence, a certain restriction 
of the substitution possibilities still exists (Werden 1997: 103). 
 
In general, the nested logit allows more realistic demand estimation while the 
advantages in computation of the logit model persist, but only in the event that 
an a priori division into subgroups is reasonable. If products can be classified 
according to multiple criteria, the hierarchical order of the nests according to 
these criteria matters since elasticity estimates are highly sensitive to a change 
of order of the classification criteria (Nevo 2000b: 525).
11 Furthermore, Bresna-
han et al. (1997: 38) stated that there is no way to decide which ordering is the 
right if several seemed to be theoretically reasonable.  
Random-coefficients Logit Models 
While logit and nested-logit assume that all consumers have the same prefer-
ence for certain product characteristics and the consumer-specific influence was 
captured solely by  ij ε , the random-coefficients model allows interaction be-
                                                            
11   The General Extreme-Value Model (Bresnahan et al. 1997) solves the problem of ordering.   
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tween individual and product characteristics (Berry et al. 1995: 846). Utility for 
a certain good is composed of a mean utility component and a consumer-
specific deviation from that mean which depends on the interaction between 
consumer preferences and product characteristics (Berry et al. 1995: 848). Ran-
dom-coefficients models are estimated using a General Methods of Moments 
(GMM) estimator (see for example Berry 1994). 
 
Random-coefficients logit models have several advantages in comparison to the 
simple and the nested logit model. The most important is that it produces de-
mand elasticities that are more realistic in that they account for different levels 
of substitutability (for a detailed discussion of advantages see Nevo 2000b: 
515ff). However, these advantages come to the cost of high complexity of com-
putation and the need for consumer-specific data (Nevo 2000b: 532). 
AIDS and PCAIDS Models 
The Almost Ideal Demand System developed by Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980) and gives an arbitrary first-order approximation to any demand system. 
It is not based on a functional form of demand, but allows for a flexible repre-
sentation of own- and cross-price elasticities determined by the data (Hausman 
& Leonard 1997: 327; Epstein & Rubinfeld 2001: 888). As the formal devel-
opment of the AIDS according to Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) is very com-
plex, only the basic idea (following Coloma 2006, as well as Epstein & Rubin-
feld 2001) is given. 
 
Consider a market of N  products, each one produced by a different firm. Ac-
cording to AIDS, the share  i s  of a product i depends on the logarithmized prices 
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The coefficients  ij b ( N j i ,.., 1 , = ) need to be determined in order to calculate the 
own-price and cross-price elasticities, used to simulate the merger price effect. 
If the market shares are positive and add up to one, the so-called “own-
coefficients”  ii b  and the “cross-coefficients”  ij b  have the same sign as the corre-
sponding elasticities. The problem with AIDS is that estimation of the coeffi-
cients is difficult to perform in cases of many different products. A market with 
N  products gives rise to 
2 N  coefficients. Hence, estimation requires a large data 
set (e.g. supermarket scanner data) or the imposition of additional assumptions 
that reduce the demand parameters to be estimated (see for example Hausman 
et al. 1994; Hausman & Leonard 1997).
12 The estimation of AIDS with scanner 
data, however, is not free of econometric problems and is limited to products 
mainly sold in supermarkets, wherefore Epstein and Rubinfeld (2001) proposed 
the Proportionality-Calibrated AIDS (PCAIDS) model that reduces the number 
of required parameters while retaining many of the properties of AIDS. 
 
PCAIDS is a calibrated demand model that necessitates information only on 
product market shares, overall price elasticity and the price elasticity of one 
single product in the market. To achieve this simplicity, the assumptions of 
proportionality, homogeneity and symmetry are made (Coloma 2006: 589). Ac-
cording to Epstein and Rubinfeld (2001: 891), the restrictive assumption of pro-
portionality is arguable when data is limited and the merging firms do not sell 
unusually close or distant substitutes. Additionally, PCAIDS guarantees proper 
signs of and consistent magnitudes for the elasticities – in contrast to AIDS, 
whose estimation sometimes yields elasticities which contradict economic the-
ory. Yet, PCAIDS is highly restrictive since its proportionality assumption re-
                                                            
12   As a consequence, AIDS has only been applied to few real mergers.  
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sembles the logit’s IIA assumption. Likewise concerning the logit model, a 
specification of nests was proposed for the PCAIDS model to overcome this 
problem (Epstein & Rubinfeld 2004). Recently, Coloma (2006) proposed an es-
timation of PCAIDS models instead of the above described calibration. His 
model resembles the AIDS estimation, but incorporates the restrictions of 
PCAIDS and allows estimation even if price data is limited to a subset of firms. 
Coloma admits, however, that estimates may be less precise than with the origi-
nal AIDS model. 
Multi-level Demand Estimation 
Hausman et al. (1994) as well as Hausman and Leonard (1997) proposed to es-
timate demand in differentiated product markets using a model of multi-level 
demand estimation. Their general idea is to divide the demand system into 
overall demand in the market – the top level – and competition between brands 
– the bottom level. An intermediate level that deals with different product seg-
ments is also possible. Suppose the car market is to be analysed. The top level 
describes total demand for cars, whereas on the second level demand in differ-
ent segments, e.g. sports, family and compact cars, is considered. On the bottom 
level, interest lies on the competition between the different brands in each seg-
ment. Overall own- and cross-price elasticities for each product can thus be de-
tected on the basis of an estimation of all three levels and the combination of 
the resulting estimates. Proceedings are bottom-up and the theory of price indi-
ces is used to guarantee consistent estimation on the higher levels. On the low-
est level AIDS specification is used while second and top level estimates are 
based on log-linear demand.  
 
The advantages of the multi-level demand estimation are due to the merits of 
estimating the demand structure rather than assuming a certain functional form 
(Hausman and Leonard 1997: 322), although the properties of AIDS and log-
linear demand used on the different levels have to be taken in mind. Most im-
portantly, detailed product level data is needed to carry out AIDS.   
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3.3.  Cournot and Supply Function Models 
Due to the reasoning presented in section 2.1, only a few papers (f.i. de Maa & 
Zwart 2005; Smidt 2005) present Cournot or supply function models. Cournot 
models are used to calculate the price effects of a merger in markets where 
quantities are the strategic parameters to be chosen.
13 Supply function models 
can be interpreted as a generalization of the Cournot model where firms choose 
their strategy using a supply curve with respect to prices instead of a fixed 
quantity. This type of a supply curve, which is upward sloping, generates a set 
of bids of price-quantity pairs (see de Maa & Zwart 2005: 160). In both models 
the market price is determined as the Nash equilibrium where every producer 
chooses his quantity  i q  or supply function  ) (p qi  such that he maximizes profit 
given the quantities or supply functions of his competitors. In order to repro-
duce real market behaviour more accurately, production capacity constraints 
may be incorporated.  
 
To determine Nash equilibrium and market price, one needs information on the 
number of firms in the relevant market, their production capacities, cost struc-
tures as well as information on market demand, which possibly requires being 
estimated (de Maa & Zwart 2005: 159). In the simple Cournot model the equi-
librium solution is that mark ups are given by the market share divided by de-
mand elasticity (Tschantz et al. 2000: 204). While this solution will be unique 
and easily calculated in the simple case of constant market shares and no pro-
duction constraints, simulation is necessary if capacity constraints are included 
and market shares are variable(de Maa & Zwart 2005: 159). For supply func-
tion models, the strategy space is not one-dimensional but an infinitely dimen-
sional set of functions, hence solution becomes analytically and numerically 
more difficult (de Maa & Zwart 2005: 160). The problem will be to predict 
which of the many equilibrium supply functions a producer will choose. In gen-
                                                            
13   It is somehow counterintuitive to calculate price changes instead of reactions in market shares when 
quantities are the strategic parameters though. This might be another reason why there cannot be 
found many simulations using Cournot Models.  
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eral, the merger price effects can be calculated by calibrating each of the two 
models with different capacity and cost structures pre- and post-merger when 
solving for the Nash equilibrium. 
 
As already noted, Cournot models are relatively easy to simulate if all neces-
sary data is available. In contrast, supply function models have a much more 
complex mathematical structure but seem to be more realistic in describing 
firms’ behaviour. In general, Cournot models are to provide an upper bound on 
the results of supply function models (de Maa & Zwart 2005: 158). 
3.4. Auction  Models 
Hitherto, basically two distinguished types of auction models were used for 
merger simulation: second-price and first-price auction models (Dalkir et al. 
2000; Tschantz et al. 2000; Brannman & Froeb 2000; Froeb et al. 1998). Note 
that the exact specification of an auction setting, however, must be found on a 
case-to-case basis. 
Second-price Auctions  
The subsequent description follows Froeb et al. (1998) as well as Brannman 
and Froeb (2000). Additional assumptions are that the valuations V of the bid-
ders are private information and consist of two independent components: an 
idiosyncratic component  i X  and a common component Y .  i X  is assumed to be 
an independent extreme value process with location and spread parameters 
) ( μ ηi . Y  is an independent random variable with mean zero and variance 
2 σ  that 
is seen as common knowledge and can be ignored in the following analysis, as 
it does not influence the identity of the winning bidder, the winning bid or the 
change in winning bids after a merger. Now the winning probabilities of each 
bidder (that correspond to the expected market share), the prices (that corre-
spond to the second highest value) and the merger effects can be calculated by 
using the simplifying properties of the extreme value distributed idiosyncratic  
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components.
14 The probability that bidder i has the highest valuation of the item 
to be auctioned and therefore will win has some interesting properties: first, if 
the variance of the value distribution increases  ) 0 ( → μ , the winning probabili-
ties converge to  n 1  which means that the heterogeneity between the different 
bidders decreases. In contrast, if the variance decreases  ) ( ∞ → μ , the heterogene-
ity is of high importance and the market share of the bidder with the highest 
valuation approaches one. Second, the distribution of the maximum of bidder 
values satisfies the IIA property meaning that the distribution does not depend 
on the ordering of the bidder values. Using the IIA property, the probability of 
observing a certain ordering among the two highest bidders can be inferred. 
Furthermore, the distribution of winning bids is derived as the distribution of 
the second-highest value conditional on the identity of the high-value bidder. It 
can be shown that the expected price or winning bid decreases if the expected 
share or winning probability rises. This is because the high-value firm does not 
bid against itself.  
 
In principle, the moments of the distribution of the second-highest bid could be 
used to construct a methods of moments (MM) estimator for the winning bid 
using auction data. However, this is problematic because at every auction a 
unique item is sold or purchased so that the data are characterised by a signifi-
cant level of heterogeneity across items. By including the common component 
Y, a between-auction variance is added to the estimation. Hence, a differentia-
tion between the within-auction variance that one is interested in and the be-
tween-auction variance of the distribution becomes impossible. Therefore, 
Froeb et al. (1998: 6) propose to estimate the distribution parameters using the 
differences between losing bids. This eliminates the between-variance. Estima-
tion of this difference is possible using a two-step, limited-information, maxi-
mum-likelihood (LIML) estimator if data on bidder identities and shares, bidder 
characteristics including the ones of losing bidders, as well as the values of bids 
(including losing bids) across the sample of auctions are available. First, the 
                                                            
14   For a detailed description of the properties of an extreme value function see Froeb et al. (1998: 3).  
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firm- or bidder-specific characteristics are used to estimate the logit probability 
of winning and the expected values of winning bids simultaneously. In this 
case, the shares are used as proxies for the probabilities of winning. Second, the 
fitted probabilities are employed to construct the likelihood for the difference 
between the second- and third-highest bids. If no data on losing bids is avail-
able, this method cannot be applied. The only solution in this case is to drop 
step number two. A distinction between a large within-variance and a large 
common-variance is therefore not feasible. Finally, the merger price effect is 
calculated using the estimated distribution parameters and the changed winning 
probability of the merged firm. The new winning probability equals the sum of 
the shares of each merging partner since the merged firm will win each auction 
that either of the original firms would have won. The price effect of the merger 
depends on the variance of the idiosyncratic component in two ways: a great 
variance increases both the amount and the variance of the price effect. The 
common component does not influence the price effect at all.  
 
In summary, this method is suitable in industries where a second-price oral auc-
tion is the best way to describe market behaviour. Nevertheless, the model has 
some limiting properties. First, it is based on the IIA property whose disadvan-
tages have already been discussed in detail in the section on logit demand mod-
els. Furthermore detailed data on many auctions in the market is necessary in 
order to apply a LIML estimator. Lastly, the model treats every auction ob-
served as independent. This might not be true if bidder-capacity constraints or 
bid-rotation schemes are to be expected (Brannman & Froeb 2000: 284). 
First-price Auctions  
A model for the simulation of merger effects in markets of asymmetric first-
price, sealed-bid, private-value auctions is proposed by Dalkir et al. (2000).  In 
their model, sellers are bidding in order to sell a good to a unique buyer. The 
lowest price each bidder is able to bid corresponds to its cost. It is assumed that 
each bidder has some number  i k  of cost draws from a technology density func- 
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tion from which he can choose the lowest one. The lowest cost draw  i c  corre-
sponds to the bidders valuation of the good and consists of a common and a 
bidder-specific random component, μ  and  i ε , respectively.  
 
(11)  i i c ε μ + =  
 
While  μ  is common knowledge,  i ε  is private and only its distribution is known 
to all bidders. It is assumed to be i.i.d. over a common support [] Δ Δ − ,  with 
0 > Δ ≥ μ . The buyer purchases a fixed quantity of the service or good at disposi-
tion at the lowest bid price. His valuation of the contract  Δ + = μ v  is common 
knowledge. In consequence, the price in equilibrium, i.e. the lowest bid, ranges 
from  Δ − μ  to  Δ + μ . 
 
If the merger price effects are analysed in the described setting, two situations 
have to be distinguished. First, consider a symmetric pre-merger market where 
each firm only has one cost draw to choose from. A merger will create asym-
metry as only the merged firm will have the opportunity to choose the lowest 
from several cost draws. Second, firms might have different numbers of draws 
before the merger – an asymmetric situation. In this case the post-merger situa-
tion can possibly lead to more symmetry in the auction. In the symmetric pre-
merger setting, a bidder maximizes its profit by setting its bid equal to the best-
response with respect to price given its costs and the number of bidders in the 
market and the equilibrium can be found analytically. For the asymmetric case 
Dalkir et al. (2000: 404ff) show that equilibrium exists under certain limiting 
conditions, but it has to be found numerically. It is worth noting that in this 
equilibrium it is possible for another bidder than the one having the lowest cost 
to get the good. Hence, cost-inefficiencies may arise in asymmetric first-price 
auctions.  
 
The merger effects are calculated by calibration of the model using pre-merger 
information on market shares and the range of the density function of costs  
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[ Δ − μ , Δ + μ ]. Dalkir et al. (2000) recommend gaining information on the spread 
of the cost function from technical staff or administrators.  Then the change of 
prices can be simulated using the calibrated model. It is possible to estimate the 
effects that arise from asymmetric firms merging to become symmetric and vice 
versa. The simulation results Dalkir et al. (2000) present for hypothetical merg-
ers
15 suggest that symmetry-increasing mergers have much smaller effects than 
symmetry-decreasing ones. 
 
Critique of the model first considers the simple form of cost density function 
that is assumed. As Tschantz et al. (2000: 211) note, the merger effects crucially 
depend on the variance of the underlying distribution. Hence, the price effect 
can be totally over- or underestimated if costs would be better modelled by a 
more complex distribution. However, the authors state that “it appears that the 
uniform [distribution function], with its ‘fat tails’ tends to represent a ‘worst 
case’ scenario in terms of merger price effects” (Dalkir et al. 2000: 400). This 
implies that their model results could serve as an upper bound. Nevertheless, it 
is questionable if reliable data for the cost structure and market demand (shares) 
needed to calibrate the model can be observed.  
 
The type of auction model chosen to simulate the merger is of high importance 
in case of asymmetry, as the results might differ significantly according to the 
chosen framework. Tschantz et al. (2000: 207ff) compare prices, shares and 
revenues as well as expected merger effects in first- and second-price auctions. 
Their main conclusions are that low-value (high cost) firms win more fre-
quently and at better prices in sealed auction and that the effects of a symmetry-
decreasing merger are smaller in sealed-bid auctions. Furthermore, the predic-
tions of an auction model depend on assumptions about costs or value distribu-
tions. Finally, it is difficult to provide statistical measures for the reliability of 
the simulated price effects (Baker & Rubinfeld 1999: 421). 
                                                            
15   They vary the number of firms and the form of (a-)symmetry pre- and post-merger as well as the co-
efficient of spread that characterises the cost density function.   
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4.  Merger Simulation Models in Competition Policy 
Practice: Prospects, Problems and Limits 
4.1.  Merger Control Cases with Simulation Models: An Overview 
Since the mid-1990s, merger simulations have been introduced to practical 
merger control cases as an additional tool to assess expected competitive effects 
by both federal U.S. antitrust agencies (the Federal Trade Commission [FTC] 
and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice [DoJ]) and the European 
Commission. Yet, the number of real merger cases where simulation models 
have been applied by an antitrust authority or one of the merging parties is still 
somewhat small.
16 In the following, we review the most important cases in US 
and European merger litigation.  
Interstate Bakeries/Continental Baking Co. & Kimberly-Clark/Scott Paper 
In 1995, the DoJ challenged two proposed mergers: the acquisition of Continen-
tal Baking by Interstate Bakeries and Kimberly-Clark’s acquisition of Scott Pa-
per. In both cases, MSM had been prepared as evidence for litigation – in the 
first case by the competition authority, in the second case by one of the merging 
companies. However, the MSMs finally did not come to use as both complaints 
were settled with mutual agreements outside the court.  
 
Continental Baking and Interstate Bakeries were two of the three largest pro-
ducers of white pan bread in the U.S., and their merger would have resulted in a 
monopoly for Interstate Bakeries in Southern California and the Midwest. Wer-
den (2000) prepared an expert report on behalf of the DoJ that included a simu- 
                                                            
16   Nevertheless, all of the model types described in section 3 have been used at least in one merger case 
described in the following.  
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lation model.
17 According to standard SSNIP analysis,
18 bread industry studies 
as well as own- and cross-price elasticity estimations, the relevant markets were 
the localized (in particular metropolitan areas) and brand-wisely differentiated 
markets for white pan bread. Therefore, simulations of post-merger prices for 
the Los Angeles area and the Chicago area were carried out assuming Bertrand 
competition and logit demand, “a relatively simple methodology for making 
more precise predictions of the price effects of mergers in differentiated prod-
ucts industries” (Werden 2000: 145). In doing so, the original market delinea-
tion became more flexible as only the merging firms’ products and its closest 
substitutes were included since exclusion of less close substitutes does not 
cause an overestimation of the price effects. Possible market entries were not 
considered and the problems involving the IIA assumption and other limitations 
of the logit demand model were not discussed. The results of the simulation 
based on point estimates for demand elasticity predicted a substantial increase 
of prices in both markets, thus supporting the complaint by the DoJ. Increases 
are biggest for the merging brands – 10% for Continental Baking and 5% for 
Interstate Bakeries – while the overall price increase lies between 3.1% in Chi-
cago and 5.9% in Los Angeles.
19 
 
The DoJ complaint against Kimberly-Clark and Scott Paper, seeking a clear-
ance of the merger under certain divestitures, was based upon expected price 
increases and competition lessening in markets for facial tissue and baby wipes 
(DoJ 1996). In preparing its defence, Kimberly-Clark commissioned a MSM by 
                                                            
17   With demand estimation still being preliminary, the draft report eventually came to use as an attach-
ment to the author’s declaration for the U.S. DOJ in opposition to Interstate Bakeries’ effort to modify 
the final judgement three years after its pronouncement (Werden 2000: 139). 
18   SSNIP = Small but Significant Non-transistory Increase in Price; standardized hypothetical monopoly 
test regularly used by U.S. antitrust authorities to define relevant markets (Kerber & Schwalbe 2008: 
262-280). 
19   Note that when the upper bound of the confidence interval of demand elasticity estimates is used to 
calculate price effect, the results vary strongly between the two markets. In Chicago, the price in-
creases are all only slightly smaller, whereas, in Los Angeles, they drop to 2.3% and 1.9% for Conti-
nental and Interstate, respectively, and to 1.3% for all products due to the much wider confidence in-
terval for Los Angeles.   
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Hausman and Leonard as their economic consultants. They employed a multi-
level demand estimation model to simulate prices for the bath tissue market 
based on weekly scanner data from 1992 to 1995 (Hausman & Leonard 1997). 
The predicted price increases absent efficiency gains for the bath tissue brands 
of Kimberly-Clark (Kleenex) and Scott Paper (Scott Tissue and Cottonelle) 
were about 2.4%, 1.2% and 1.4% and stated as not significantly different from 
zero. If efficiency gains
20 are taken into consideration, the price effects become 
smaller or even negative (Hausman & Leonard 1997: 336) – a result that was 
certainly in line with Kimberly-Clark’s interest. Yet, the model does not gener-
ate completely consistent results (Epstein & Rubinfeld 1999). Several estimated 
cross-price elasticities are negative which contradicts the assumption of all 
products in the market being substitutes. Furthermore, many of the estimated 
cross-price elasticities are of low precision making the predicted price effects 
highly uncertain (ibid.: 901). Alternative model approaches like logit demand 
simulation or PCAIDS do not produce completely different price changes 
though (Epstein & Rubinfeld 2001). For example, logit predictions for Kleenex 
are higher than the multi-stage demand results, whereas those for Cottonelle are 
smaller. Hausman and Leonard (1999: 336) interpret this as a consequence of 
the restrictions put on cross price elasticities in logit models.  
Staples/Office Depot 
The proposed but eventually blocked merger between Staples and Office Depot 
(U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 1997), the two largest office 
superstore chains in the U.S., represents a landmark case for the employment of 
modern quantitative economic instruments. Despite not being a merger simula-
tion case in the narrow sense, we briefly discuss it due to its paramount impor-
tance as it “highlights the power of [quantitative and empirically based fore-
casts of future prices] when it can be obtained and when it tells a clear story 
consistent with the available documentary and testimonial evidence” (Baker 
1999b: 21). This key case first applied unilateral effects theory, extensive 
                                                            
20   They have been estimated to correspond to a 24% marginal cost reduction by Kimberly-Clark.  
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econometric analysis, the influence of significant efficiencies and the likelihood 
of entry analysis all at once.
21 
 
Both parties to the trial provided extensive econometric evidence and expert 
testimonies (Warren-Boulton and Ashenfelter for the FTC; Hausman for the de-
fendants) to the court, playing an important role in the litigation (Baker 1999b: 
11). The expert group of the FTC stated in court that the proposed merger of 
Staples and Office Depot would lead to a price increase of 5 to 10% in overlap-
ping markets. The models used to explore how Staples prices vary by time and 
store in reaction to a change in the number of Office Depot stores nearby were 
simple reduced-form price equations explaining prices by variables (for in-
stance, the number and identity of nearby superstore and non-superstore rivals 
as well as determinants of costs and demand) that were assumed to be exoge-
nous or predetermined. For the simulation of post-merger prices two different 
scenarios were considered: the defendants proposed to assume all Office Depot 
stores near Staples to be shut down while the FTC fostered the idea that all Of-
fice Depot stores will be converted into Staples stores. The underlying data set 
applied by the FTC covered around 400 Staples stores in more than 40 cities 
over 18 month on a monthly basis.  
 
The FTC econometrically analysed which prices Staples charged in presence or 
absence of an Office Depot store using a cross-sectional approach. They found 
that prices were significantly lower when Staples had to compete with Office 
Depot and that a merger would allow Staples average price increases by over 
7%. The defendants criticised the model design, speculating that the cross-
sectional comparison was biased upwards because of the omission of variables 
controlling for market-specific costs possibly resulting from local zoning or 
congestion charges. As an alternative, the defendants’ economic expert submit-
ted a panel fixed-effects model (incorporating dummy variables for the individ-
ual stores, thereby controlling for unobservable costs, as they are not expected 
                                                            
21   See on this case inter alia Baker (1999b); Baker & Rubinfeld (1999); Dalkir & Warren-
Boulton (2004); Baker & Pitofsky (2008).  
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to vary over time) that produced considerably smaller price increases of just 
1%. However, the FTC disagreed and concluded that the lower estimates of the 
defendants’ fixed-effects model were caused by conceptional measurement er-
rors of the rivalry variables.
22 In line with this reasoning, the results of the FTC 
expert’s own fixed-effects simulation did not differ much from the first cross-
sectional regression estimates.
23 Furthermore, the FTC supposed Staples’ fixed-
effects model to suffer from sample selection bias, since it excluded all obser-
vations in California.  
 
Another key discussion in the process concerned efficiencies and the pass-
through rates of the resulting merger-specific cost savings. While the defen-
dants argued that Staples’ pass-through rate was about two thirds, the FTC 
economists developed a model that estimated them to be only about 15%. The 
model explicitly distinguished between industry-wide costs and Staples’ firm-
specific costs. The judge finally opted for the latter model and concluded that 
possible merger efficiency gains would not be passed through to the consumers 
and, therefore, cannot countervail the expected price increases. All in all, the 
judge’s decision to accept quantitative economic evidence represents a mile-
stone and, furthermore, encouraged the use of both econometric studies and 
simulation techniques.  
 
                                                            
22   The merging parties’ expert measured the presence of rivals by non-overlapping circles of 0 to 5, 5 to 
10 and 10 to 20 miles from the Staples stores. The FTC’s expert, however, argued that all rivals in a 
metropolitan area have to be included. An inclusion of this criterion in addition of the measure used 
by the merging parties increased the simulated price effect from 1% to 2.5-3.7%. The defendants fi-
nally conceded in trial that the use of the metropolitan area-based measure of competition was more 
reasonable.  
23   The FTC cross-section estimates led to a price increase of 7.1% due to the merger, the fixed-effects 
based price effect was about 7.6% in overlap markets.   
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Volvo/Scania 
During the 1999 merger control procedure of the proposed merger between 
Sweden’s Volvo and Scania,
24 the European Commission commissioned a 
simulation study carried out by Ivaldi and Verboven. This study received some 
controversy throughout the proceedings and, eventually, the Commission (2000: 
22) declared that “[g]iven the novelty of the approach and the level of dis-
agreement, [it] will not base its assessment on the results of the study”. How-
ever, “the results of such econometric studies can be a valuable supplement to 
the way the Commission has traditionally measured market power” (ibid.). 
Based upon more traditional analysis, the Commission declared the merger to 
be incompatible with the common market as it would have created a dominant 
position of Volvo in the market for heavy trucks, touring, inter-city and city 
buses in several North-European countries.
25  
 
Ivaldi and Verboven (2005a) performed simulation based on a nested logit 
model using panel data on list prices and horsepower for two types of trucks for 
each of the seven major truck manufacturers in 16 different European countries 
in 1997 and 1998. According to their model specification, three nests were dis-
tinguished: rigid trucks, tractor trucks and outside goods. Furthermore, country- 
and firm-specific dummies, as well as instrumental variables accounting for 
price endogeneity were included. The total number of products in the market 
including the outside goods was defined as average total sales in 1997-1998 
multiplied by a market factor  0 . 4 = r  that was chosen after sensitivity tests had 
proven this value to be rather conservative in prediction of prices. However, the 
strict time limit of EU merger control proceedings restricted sensitivity analysis 
and caused some very simplifying and debatable assumptions (Ivaldi & Ver-
boven 2005a: 680, 690). In general, the results indicated serious anticompetitive 
price effects of more than 10-23% for rigid trucks and 7-13% for tractor trucks 
                                                            
24   Relevant markets included manufacture and sale of trucks, buses, construction equipment, marine and 
industrial engines. 
25   In Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark and Ireland the combined market shares of the merging par-
ties lie between 49 and 91% (European Commission 2000: 19).  
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in the Scandinavian countries and Ireland for the merging parties, while the 
price responses by competitors were small. The 95% confidence interval of 
consumer surplus loss, measured as increase in the industry price index, was 
negative for all countries under consideration. Possible efficiency gains, a pre-
dicted 5% marginal cost saving, would not lead to an increase of consumer sur-
plus in the five Nordic countries.  
 
Volvo’s own economic advisors criticised the model as flawed and unreliable 
(Hausman & Leonard 2005). First, they claimed substantial measurement errors 
in the data because it did not account for optional features, for instance, it re-
ferred to list prices instead of actual transaction prices and considers only two 
observations on each truck model in each country.
26 In consequence, a down-
ward bias in the estimated price elasticities was expected, leading to an upward 
bias in price effects. Furthermore, they criticised the lack of a specification test 
and performed several tests on their own, indicating inadequateness of the IIA 
assumption of the nested logit model and considerable differences in the de-
mand parameters between several subgroups of countries. Other points of criti-
cism concerned the choice of the market factor r and the compatibility of simu-
lation results with economic theory and the particular market. The controversy 
among the economic advisors triggered an academic debate entailing mutual 
criticism of the employed tests, methods, models and interpretation of the eco-
nomic results (Hausman & Leonard 2005; Ivaldi & Verboven 2005a,b).  
Lagardère/Natexis/VUP 
In the 2003 Lagardère/Natexis/VUP merger, the European antitrust authority 
actually referred to a simulation in its decision (European Commission 2004a; 
Röller & Friederiszick 2007). The model withstood the opposing parties’ criti-
cism and was accepted by the Commission as robust and reliable. The transac-
tion between Lagardère (communication, media and publishing) and 
Natexis/VUP (inter alia creative publishing) was eventually cleared under sev-
                                                            
26   With the words of Walker (2005: 478) “a study based on prices nobody pays for trucks nobody buys”.  
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eral conditions including significant divestitures (European Commission 2004a: 
178). 
 
The Commission’s experts, Foncel and Ivaldi, concentrated on the differenti-
ated products market for general literature in paperback and hardcover format 
and estimated demand using nested logit (Ivaldi 2005). Data on prices and vol-
ume was provided by the IPSOS market research institute and made available 
by the merging parties. In their model, consumers’ demand decisions were as-
sumed to be hierarchical in that first the type of book, e.g. humour, thriller or 
love story, and on a second level a specific book is chosen. The simulated price 
increase for the merging parties’ books was reported as 4.84% if paperback and 
hardcover books are seen as one market with a 95% confidence interval running 
from 3.74 to 5.45%. Distinctive estimations for the two book types lead to price 
changes of 5.51% for paperbacks and only 1.59% for hardcover books, where-
fore the European Commission (2004a: 179) concluded that the bulk of the av-
erage price increase must be due to the increase in paperback books.  
 
The critique of the merging parties focused on market definition. First, they ar-
gued that the model neglects the vertical structure of the book market. Second, 
they claimed that the model does not sufficiently differentiate between paper-
back and hardcover. Finally, the model was said to not take into account the 
way how publishing and book price determination work in reality (European 
Commission 2004a: 179ff). The Commission judged all these critical arguments 
as unfounded and declared the study as “particularly robust by reason of the 
very large number of observations, the stability of the various parameters esti-
mated, the high degree of statistical power of the tests provided, and the simula-
tion of a confidence interval for the calculation of a price increase” (European 
Commission 2004a: 179, fn 543). In consequence, the study was used in support 
of its concerns for anticompetitive merger effects.   
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Nuon/Reliant 
In 2003, Nuon, a leading Dutch energy utility company, notified its acquisition 
of Reliant Energy Europe, one of the major electricity generators in the Nether-
lands, to the national competition authority (Nederlands Mededingingsautoriteit 
– NMa). Part of the following NMa investigation were two different simulation 
models developed by external consultants from Energy Study Center (ECN) 
and Frontier Economics. After their in-depth analysis, the NMa decided to ap-
prove the merger under serious divestiture conditions (de Maa & Zwart 2005: 
150ff). Nuon, however, appealed the NMa decision at the Court of Rotterdam, 
submitting critical reviews of the agency’s MSMs by economists from NERA 
Economic Consulting (NERA 2005). After revision of all evidence, the court 
annulled the decision of the competition agency, dismissing the results of the 
MSMs as unreliable and the parties’ interpretation of them as arbitrary.  
 
The electricity market belongs to the exceptional cases where the use of a 
Cournot or supply function model can be adequate (inter alia homogeneous 
product, lack of short term demand elasticity, the absence of storage request to 
balance production and demand at every moment to a certain price, demand 
varies considerably by time, capacity limits of production and transmission are 
of great importance; de Maa & Zwart 2005: 153). Most data needed to model 
oligopolistic price equilibria were available. The ECN employed a Cournot 
model for all electricity generators in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and 
France. The calculated price effects were highest for peak hours of demand in 
winter (about 7.9%) and lowest for base hours in summer (3.4%) with an aver-
age price increase estimated to be about 5.9% (de Maa & Zwart 2005). Yet, it is 
questionable if the model adequately represents industry behaviour, because es-
timated and observed market prices differ by a great amount for demand elastic-
ities that are assumed to be realistic. However, the difference might be the re-
sult of the generators’ fearing of regulatory intervention if they set profit maxi-
mising prices or that longer term considerations not included in the model re-
sulted in the over prediction (de Maa & Zwart 2005).   
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In contrast to ECN, the Frontier Economics team estimated a supply function 
model restricted to Dutch generators with different supply curves for each hour 
of the day. In order to reduce possible strategies, supply functions were re-
stricted to correspond to marginal cost curves multiplied by a constant mark up 
factor from a finite set lying between 1 and 15. In result, multiple pre- and post 
merger equilibrium prices for each demand level and all possible mark up com-
binations for all producers were found (de Maa and Zwart 2005: 166). Interpre-
tation of these equilibria as well as the choice of the right equilibrium is there-
fore of special interest. Higher price equilbria seemed to occur earlier in the 
post merger situation. In the following, the NMa chose to concentrate on the 
change of maximum, minimum and median price equilbria due to the merger. 
While the lower bound prices hardly increased at all, the median price level in-
creased about 13%, averaged over all hours of the year. For the maximum price 
level the increase was even higher. Sensitivity tests that allowed for a more re-
alistic price responsiveness of industrial demand led to smaller price effects 
close to the above mentioned Cournot results. Nevertheless, the NMa inter-
preted the model’s outcomes as evidence for the strengthening of 
Nuon/Reliant’s dominant position in the Dutch power market.  
 
In response to the NMa’s decision, Noun appealed on court and its economic 
advisors harshly criticized the supply function model (NERA 2005). As they 
were not allowed to view the original model, they built a ‘shadow model’ based 
on the available general descriptions and investigated its properties. NERA’s 
critique mainly consisted of two points. First, they found that the outcomes cru-
cially depended on the assumption of large steps between the mark up levels 
which represented the strategies available to the generators. They judged them 
as unrealistic because they ruled out the possibility of small price reductions. 
Consequently, many Nash equilibria were only sustainable because small re-
ductions in prices which would have been profitable in reality were ruled out by 
assumption. Second, no basis for the choice of median prices as the likely out-
come in pre- and post merger situations was provided. In NERA’s opinion the 
merger might possibly be a disturbance that changes industry from a pre-merger  
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equilibrium of maximum prices to an equilibrium with minimum prices post-
merger. Hence, a price increase can only be inferred from the multiple equilib-
ria system with certainty if the maximum pre-merger price was smaller than the 
minimum post-merger price.  
Oracle/PeopleSoft 
So far, the most discussed case seems to be the Oracle/PeopleSoft merger,
27 the 
only case that was suited both in the EU and the U.S. It allows for an explicit 
comparison of two different MSM applied to the same industry. Moreover, the 
Oracle/PeopleSoft case was the first to have a full-blown merger simulation 
model to be discussed in an U.S. courtroom and the first to have a simulation 
model developed by Commission economists in-house. Despite the MSMs on 
both sides of the Atlantic pointed to considerable anticompetitive effects from 
the merger, neither the U.S. nor the EU competition agencies eventually man-
aged to block the merger (European Commission 2004b; U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California 2004). 
 
In 2003, Oracle, a U.S. company that develops, manufactures and distributes 
enterprise application software (EAS), database and application server software, 
launched a hostile bid for its U.S. rival PeopleSoft (European Commission 
2004b: 3). Oracle and PeopleSoft were the second and third largest vendors of 
EAS worldwide behind SAP at that point in time, and both the DoJ and the 
Commission started in-depth investigations expecting serious anticompetitive 
effects from the merger. The DoJ asked McAfee (2004) to develop a simulation 
model measuring the unilateral effects of the merger.
28 An English auction 
model was chosen that allowed for multiple bidders and multiple rounds of bid-
ding. Necessary variables and assumptions for calibration included – inter alia – 
market shares which should proxy the probability of winning and a measure of 
                                                            
27  See inter alia Keyte (2004); Bengtsson (2005); Pflanz (2005); Botteman (2006); Werden (2006); 
Zimmer (2006); Budzinski & Christiansen (2007). 
28   For the following details on the model see U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 
(2004: 150-151, 195ff).  
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the pre-merger level of competition. The market shares were calculated for two 
comparatively narrowly delineated relevant markets: high function Financial 
Management Systems (FMS) and high function Human Resources (HR) soft-
ware in the U.S., comprising only Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP as relevant com-
petitors and ignoring smaller competitors and possible entrants. McAfee (2004: 
2) decided not to include any efficiency gains because he found substantial sup-
port for small marginal costs in the software industry that are unlikely to fall as 
a result of the merger. The simulated price increases for different scenarios 
ranged from 5 to 11% for FMS and from 13 to 30% for HR.  
 
The Commission’s expert team developed a sealed-bid auction model where the 
vendors know the identity of their competitors but cannot observe the monetary 
value customers assign to the different competing products (see Bengtsson 2005 
for details). The vendors choose their bid absent information on their competi-
tors’ bids based on a calculation of expected profits depending on price and 
winning probability. Costs are ignored in the model, as they are assumed to be 
sunk before the bidding. The relevant market was defined similarly to the U.S. 
model as the high function HR and FMS software market, but worldwide in-
stead of limited to the USA. In difference to the DoJ specification, however, the 
Commission included possible efficiency gains through the differentiation of 
two scenarios – a pessimistic one where the product quality did not change after 
the merger and an optimistic one with an increase in product quality. Further-
more, the model was calibrated assuming different pre-merger quality levels 
and levels of uncertainty of the product quality for the products in the FMS and 
HR market. In consequence, this led to a wide range of price and consumer sur-
plus effects. In the HR market, where Oracle’s pre-merger product was assumed 
to be of minor quality in comparison to its competitors, price increases varied 
from 6.8% in the pessimistic scenario under high uncertainty to 25.5% in the 
optimistic scenario with low uncertainty. In the FMS market, the Commission 
assumed that SAP first offers a product superior to its two competitors and that 
Oracle could improve its quality by 10% post-merger in the optimistic scenario. 
In result, price increases from 13.9 to 30% depending on the level of uncer- 
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tainty and the underlying scenario were found. In general, customers were 
harmed both through the loss of choice and the increase in price, both effects 
depending on the level of substitution between the merging products (Bengtsson 
2005: 147).  
 
In summary, both models found high and rather similar price effects (see table 
1) despite different auction forms and market definitions. This can be viewed in 
support of the robustness of the results to alternative model specifications 
(Budzinski & Christiansen 2007a: 153). Nevertheless, the U.S. model was re-
jected by court and the EU model abandoned by the Commission, both with 
reference to (i) a lack of reliability of the results and (ii) false market defini-
tions, in particular the ignorance of additional smaller competitors in the 
MSMs. Surprisingly, the simulation model was completely rejected rather than 
adjusted to the broader market definition both in the European and the U.S. liti-
gation.
29 Although the U.S. District Court (2004: 45) and the Commission 
(2004b: 48) explicitly highlighted the general usefulness of merger simulations 
(Zimmer 2006: 693), high standards regarding the reliability and certainty of the 
predictions were set on both sides of the Atlantics and the available MSMs 
struggled to meet them.  
 
                                                            
29   Zimmer (2006: 693) supposes that it might have been due to a lack of time or the fact that the Com-
mission actually preferred to abandon the model and clear the case instead of risking to conflict with 
the before announced U.S. judgement. Botteman (2006: 96) even reports that an economist from the 
Commission engaged in the case had explained that the integration of additional buyers would have 
increases the complexity of the MSM to an extent that inconsistent price effects would have resulted.  
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Table 1.  Simulated Price Increases for the Oracle/PeopleSoft Merger 
Price increase  U.S. DOJ  European Commission*
Market for high function 
FMS  5 – 11 %  6.8 – 21.1 % 
Market for high function 
HR  13 – 30 %  14.3 – 29.9 % 
* These figures relate to the pessimistic scenario without efficiencies. 
Source: Bengtsson (2005) and U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (2004). 
4.2.  Problems of the Use of Merger Simulation as an Antitrust Instru-
ment 
The question whether merger simulation should be used as a competition policy 
instrument at all can easily be answered in the affirmative. Every method that 
adds information and improves decision-making in merger control cases is wel-
comed to contribute to improve antitrust. In addition, MSMs force the experts 
to reveal the underlying assumptions of the models and, thereby, contribute to 
transparency and clearness of the line of argument. Nevertheless, a survey on 
merger simulation as an antitrust instrument must also point to the limitations 
and problems of this innovative instrument. After all, using merger simulation 
as an antitrust instrument implies that real-world policy decisions are based 
upon its result and that it counts as evidence and must stand the requirements of 
law. In the following, we review seven fields of (sometimes rather practical) 
problems that have occurred in this context in the literature as well as in the ac-
tual proceedings (as discussed in the preceding section). 
Data Availability 
One obvious limitation for the use of merger simulation is data availability. 
Comprehensive and precise data is required in order to calibrate MSM so that 
reliable results can be derived. In many markets, such data is simply not avail-
able. We suppose that this is the main reason why the number of cases involv- 
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ing merger simulation is still somewhat limited (see also Ivaldi 2005: 103). Al-
though a lack of data also affects the quality of other methods of assessing 
mergers, for instance structural or qualitative analysis, the effect is particularly 
severe regarding quantitative tools since they cannot be carried out without suf-
ficient data at all. 
Form of Competition 
Obviously, the reliability of MSM as antitrust instruments depends on an ade-
quate identification of the underlying competition process. As seen in chapter 3, 
oligopoly theory (as well as auction theory for markets with corresponding 
characteristics) with its basic distinction between price- and quantity competi-
tion supplies the theoretical fundament. Thus the quality of the results depends 
on how adequate (advanced!) Bertrand- and Cournot models describe real mar-
ket competition. This might impose some limitations if neither class of models 
suffices to match a given case as real-world competition is a complex and mul-
tifaceted phenomenon whose features reach beyond available advanced oligop-
oly models.
30 This limitation should become lessened in the course of theory 
progress; however, it will not be completely erased. 
 
A related problem refers to the possibility of structural interruptions that are 
caused by the merger in question. MSM predict future prices and quantities by 
employing a model of the pre-merger market, calibrated with pre-merger data 
and adjusted to the post-merger situation by parameters like market share, cost 
variables or measures of product variability In doing so, these models assume 
that the form of competition will not change due to the merger – for instance, 
Bertrand-competition will remain Bertrand-competition and not switch to 
Cournot-competition. While this assumption may be unproblematic in many 
cases, there is some plausibility, however, for the occurrence of other cases 
                                                            
30   For instance, Slade (2006: 22) argues that in case of differentiated product industries focus should be 
shifted to ‘brand fit’ instead of thinking about market definition and market shares. She claims that a 
0/1 classification of whether brands belong into the same market or not is not helpful in many appli-
cations since the dimensions along which different brands compete might be continuous.  
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(Werden 1997: 98). Mergers in narrow oligopolies are considered to be a par-
ticularly rewarding area for merger simulation (because of their complex eco-
nomic effects). If the market structure changes in a narrow oligopoly, say for 
instance from 4 to 3 or 3 to 2, this implies a particularly severe change of the 
business environment for the oligopolists and, therefore, their adjustment of 
strategies might be more than marginal. Considerable changes in the way oli-
gopolists are competing tend to overstrain MSM because of the missing nexus 
to measurable past market behaviour. As insights from cognitive economics 
(e.g. Kahneman 2003a, 2003b) demonstrate, decision-makers tend to create al-
ternative strategies not until the ‘old’ recipes fail (new framing; adjustment of 
mental models), in other words, changes in the form of competition can hardly 
be simulated because they are not predictable and non-anticipatable, as they are 
non-existent before the new situation actually takes place. 
Neglect of Non-quantifiable and Long-run Competitive Effects 
Currently available merger simulation model tend to focus on short-run price 
and output effects (Bengtsson 2005: 141). The underlying reasons are (i) the 
importance of these effects for welfare, (ii) the quantifiability of these effects, 
and (iii) these effects used to dominate theoretical industrial economics, where-
fore a large number of well-developed models with this focus is available. 
However, there is more to competition than short-run price and output effects – 
and these additional dimensions of competition also contribute to welfare (e.g. 
Farrell 2006). Competition represents a superior coordination mechanism for 
economic behaviour because it induces allocative efficiency (short-term welfare 
effects), innovative efficiency (incentives to innovate and imitate; mid-term 
welfare effects), adaptive efficiency (keeping the economy flexible regarding 
changing environments; evolutionary welfare effects; long-term welfare ef-
fects), consumer sovereignty (producers are induced to adjust their supply ac-
cording to the preferences of the consumers) and contributes to economic free-
dom (liberal welfare effects) (e.g. Budzinski  2008a).  
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Inter alia, Scheffman (2004), Bengtsson (2005) and Walker (2005, 487-490) 
point out that even short-run (often) non-quantifiable and non-price elements of 
competition – like e.g. barriers to entry and exit, buyer power, brand, promotion 
and placement effects, shelf space competition, strategy effects on/of market 
participants, etc. – can hardly be included in MSM since the available oligopoly 
and auction models do not capture these dimensions of competition.
31 This is 
even truer for mid- and long-run effects like innovation or adaptability. It must 
be emphasized that the tendency to neglect these kinds of welfare-relevant ef-
fects is not the result of some sort of appreciation or deliberate decision. In-
stead, it comes as an (unintended?) by-product: these effects are not included in 
MSM because they cannot be modelled and/or quantified. However, lacking 
ability to make a phenomenon mathematically feasible or to quantify the re-
spective variables does not mean that these effects carry less importance for 
real-world welfare. Therefore, reliance on MSM in real-world merger cases 
might entail the risk of neglecting some important welfare effects, thereby caus-
ing deficient decisions. More structural or other more qualitative assessment 
tools, however, can provide information about non-quantifiable effects and 
even if this information was restricted to plausibility arguments,
32 these meth-
ods would inject additional knowledge that is important to protect competition 
and increase welfare. 
 
Again, these limitations might well be alleviated as theory and simulation tech-
niques progress. However, it must also be considered that some effects might 
remain being non-quantifiable due to their nature.  
                                                            
31   See for an expert debate on this issue Froeb, Scheffman and Werden (2004).  
32   In most cases, the more traditional instruments allow for a much deeper analysis and assessment than 
mere plausibility arguments.  
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Competing Models 
Each MSM inevitably must simplify the underlying real case (complexity re-
duction) in order to create meaningful information or, as Joan Robinson (1962: 
33) puts it: “A model which took account of all the variegation of reality would 
be of no more use than a map at the scale of one to one.” At the same time, the 
inevitable simplification and complexity reduction offers scope for the con-
struction of competing models and their injection into antitrust cases by inter-
ested parties – as it has happened in the some of the existing cases (see section 
4.1). As a consequence, a selection problem exists: which MSM among the 
competing proposals is most adequate for a given case, i.e. mirrors most appro-
priately the relevant features of the simulated real market? One way to deal with 
this selection problem is to define standards for the ‘technical’ quality of MSMs 
acceptable for antitrust cases (Werden et al. 2004). Although this important step 
should reduce the scope for arbitrarily composed models, it cannot completely 
prevent that competing models with incompatible predictions, all of which fulfil 
these standards, are injected into an antitrust procedure by the parties.
33 The 
complex multi-parameter character of merger cases in competitive markets im-
plies that different models with mutually contrary conclusions regarding the 
pro- or anticompetitive impact of a given merger proposal most likely refer to 
differing ways of reducing real-world complexity. In other words, the elaborate 
modelling of one parameter usually comes at the expense of a stronger simplifi-
cation of another, so that incompatible MSMs of the same case simplify on dif-
ferent parameters or, respectively, put their modelling emphasis on different pa-
                                                            
33   Two examples that did not involve MSMs illustrate this point: Both in the Microsoft cases and in the 
eventually aborted GE-Honeywell-merger, well-respected economic experts came to completely con-
trary conclusions. This triggered to elaborate discourses within the scientific community of econom-
ics without achieving a consensus in regard to which side’s analysis was more appropriate. See for an 
illustrative reading Bresnahan (2001); Fisher & Rubinfeld (2001); Gilbert & Katz (2001); Schmalen-
see (2001); Werden (2001); Evans & Salinger (2002); Nalebuff (2002); Reynolds & Ordover (2002); 
Gerber (2003); Evans et al. (2005).  
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rameters.
34 As a consequence, the solution of the selection problem becomes 
aggravated by two effects: 
 
(i)  The policy dimension of the selection problem refers to political inter-
ests of experts (working for the competition authority or the merging 
companies or their competitors, customers or suppliers) as well as to 
the problem whether law courts and judges are sufficiently equipped to 
understand and appropriately deal with the proposed models (e.g. 
Mandel 1999; Posner 1999; Hovenkamp 2002).
35 Partisan models in-
jected by the parties to an antitrust case need not be of insufficient qual-
ity just because they are biased. Furthermore, from an economic per-
spective of self-interested agents and agencies, the competition authori-
ties are not necessarily completely unbiased either. If each side to a trial 
sends (f.i. equally) high-ranked experts to defend their case, then it 
might become rather difficult for a decision body, for instance a law 
court, to discriminate between the proposed models. ‘Neutral’ experts 
appointed by the decision body (if it is nonpartisan) might offer a solu-
tion (that, however, is associated with some practical caveats). 
 
(ii)  The analytical dimension of the selection problem refers to the theo-
retical availability of a ‘best’ model. Even if no distortions by biased 
experts, interested parties and insufficiently equipped authorities ex-
isted (ideal antitrust procedure), it might be impossible to unambigu-
ously identify the most appropriate model among the available ones 
due to them being all imperfect and possessing the same ‘distance’ to 
the underlying real case (Budzinski 2008b). 
 
                                                            
34   A simultaneous increase in the complexity of each parameters modelling has its limits because of the 
necessity to reduce real-world complexity. 
35   Slade (2006) discusses a respective trade-off between simplicity and accuracy of MSMs that some-
what constitutes a dilemma problem.  
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Although the problem of contrary opinions in principle is inherent to all types 
of assessment methods for competitive impact, quantitative instruments are par-
ticularly vulnerable in this regard. The reason lies in the factual effects of quan-
titative evidence for the applied standard of proof. 
Problems of Predictive Quantitative Economic Evidence 
Injecting the results of MSMs as evidence into court procedures of merger cases 
has revealed an additional caveat. When it comes to assessing this type of eco-
nomic evidence, the degree of certainty plays an important role. For instance, in 
Oracle, the clear and consistent predictions of the MSM were dismissed be-
cause they were assessed to be not sufficiently certain due to an incomplete 
modelling of the case (see section 4.1). Apart from the fact that economic mod-
elling can never be complete in that sense (see the preceding paragraphs), some 
confusion seem to result from a mix-up of forensic and predictive evidence. If 
one applies the same standard of proof to MSM-results as to forensic evidence, 
then this actually implies the underlying assumption that the evolution of the 
world is deterministic. In an indeterministic world, an asymmetry between fo-
rensic and predictive methods exists: the results of a MSM-model can never 
achieve a degree of certainty comparable to the genetic fingerprint,
36 simply be-
cause future effects can not be perfectly foreseen.
37 Now of course, this is 
equally true for qualitative reasoning about merger effects. However, numerical 
predictions entail a sense of precision – actually a pseudo-precision
38 – that is 
suitable for mechanically increasing the expectations on the degree of certainty 
of that prediction. The problem of the interaction of predictive quantitative eco-
nomic evidence and the standard of proof as well as the allocation of the burden 
of proof has not yet been sufficiently analysed (for a preliminary attempt see 
                                                            
36   In this respect, it is inappropriate to attempt to sell MSMs to courts as the ‘economic variant of the 
genetic fingerprint’ – moreover, it entails the danger of raising non-accomplishable expectations. 
37   The effects from the inevitable complexity reduction and the fundamental uncertainty of future mutu-
ally reinforce each other. 
38   “Precise numerical outputs are reported, but with no sense of the confidence that can be placed in the 
estimates. This produces a false sense of precision” (Hansen & Heckman 1996: 98).  
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Budzinski & Christiansen 2007b). However, there is empirical indication from 
the U.S. that a stronger reliance on quantitative economic evidence might unin-
tentionally weaken antitrust enforcement, in particular in the area of merger 
control, for exactly these reasons (Baker & Shapiro 2007). 
Costs-Benefit-Analysis of Merger Simulation 
The use of MSMs in merger control procedure targets a clear benefit: improv-
ing the quality of the decisions in order to reduce erroneous decisions.
39 How-
ever, as there can be no free lunch, the employment of MSM entails some addi-
tional costs (Voigt & Schmidt 2005; Christiansen 2006). This includes ‘direct’ 
costs like costs of data collection, payment for expertise, computer hours, man-
power, etc. as well as costs in terms of a potential extension of the duration of 
proceedings and possibly a reduction in legal certainty (Zimmer 2006). The lat-
ter might result from a decreased predictability of the outcome of the competi-
tive assessment: a more structural analysis along the lines of rather rough prox-
ies might be easier to anticipate by business companies in advance of the actual 
authority decision than the outcomes of a detailed simulation. Since rational 
business companies consider competition laws and authority practice when de-
signing a merger project, decreased legal certainty represents additional costs 
for merger activities, including efficiency-increasing ones. Furthermore, next to 
the increased costs for the competition agencies that employ MSMs, the merg-
ing parties (and its competitors) are likely to bear additional costs throughout 
the proceedings. On the one hand, notification and submission requirements in-
crease with the use of simulation instruments (usually no compensation is paid 
for costs of material provision of the merging companies). On the other hand, 
the merging parties would possibly want to challenge the simulation by the au-
thority by commissioning an own simulation with perhaps differing results. In 
                                                            
39   Details depend on the concrete criterion that a jurisdiction applies to mergers. These criterions differ 
across jurisdictions, examples being the change of consumer welfare, the change of total welfare, 
weighted combinations of the changes of consumers’ and producers’ surplus, creation or strengthen-
ing of market domination, public interest, and many more.   
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some cases, even competitors might want to inject an own model in order to 
serve their interests. 
 
Altogether, MSMs are not cheap instruments and an economical merger control 
procedure must assess whether the expected benefits (decision improvement) 
exceed the costs. If the effects of merger proposals are quite clear-cut, say for 
instance, in a monopolisation case or in a case where no competition concerns 
arise at all, then the costs of MSMs are likely to exceed the benefits. However, 
if a merger proposal includes pro- and anticompetitive effects and the net effect 
on competition is rather unclear after a more general structural analysis, then 
additional information like simulation results are more likely to yield benefits 
that outscore the costs. 
Case-by-case Analysis versus Rule-based Competition Policy 
A related issue is the controversy between the proponents of a more rule-based 
merger control and the advocates of merger control by case-by-case analysis. In 
a way, this controversy relates to the more general debate on per se rule versus 
rule of reason in antitrust. However, in practice, merger control is virtually al-
ways a matter of rule of reason. Notwithstanding this, applying a rule of reason 
still offers scope for having more or less differentiated rules and assessment cri-
teria, for instance classifying mergers and treating classes of mergers as a whole 
versus completely analysing each single merger. The question is how in depth 
should we look into a single merger case, or, in other words, what is the optimal 
degree of rule differentiation (Christiansen & Kerber 2006; Kerber et al. 2008).  
The availability of the instrument MSMs alone might favour a tendency to-
wards more case-by-case analysis. The pros and cons of such a development 
mirror the cost-benefit analysis in the preceding paragraphs. However, MSM 
might also play a useful role for a more rule-based merger control. The applica-
tion of MSMs might yield valuable insights about the competitive effects of 
certain types of mergers, thus allowing for designing better rules for these  
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classes of mergers (without applying it on a merger-by-merger basis to all fur-
ther similar cases).  
Conclusions for Merger Control 
At times, comments about the potentials of MSM seem to suggest that they are 
suitable to replace the structural analysis of competition cases: “Merger simula-
tion (…) eliminates much of the subjective and idiosyncratic judgment other-
wise inherent in the assessment of mergers” (Crooke et al. 1999: 206), or: 
“With merger simulation, transparent formal economic modelling substitutes 
for intuition. Merger simulation thereby replaces subjective and unverifiable 
surmise with objective and verifiable calculation” (Werden 2005: 43). How-
ever, the discussion of the limitations of merger simulation as an antitrust in-
strument demonstrates that over-optimism might lead to welfare-endangering 
policy advice. Once again, MSM represent an important and highly useful addi-
tion to the more traditional instruments of merger control. However, a simula-
tion-based analysis needs to be complemented by a more traditional analysis in 
order to actually reap its benefits. Furthermore, more research is necessary as to 
when a given case should be subject to an elaborate and costly simulation since 
for economic reasons its utility (improvement of decision quality) must cover 
its costs. This refers to the necessity of a rigorous analysis of the adequate dif-
ferentiation of rules. 
4.3.  Ex Post Evaluation of the Performance of Merger Simulations 
Although merger simulation models are frequently used in antitrust analysis, up 
to now only few studies exist that try to review ex post how successful merger 
simulations have been in predicting price effects (Ashenfelter & Hosken 2008: 
8; Werden et al. 2004: 1). Nevo (2000a) applied a Bertrand-type simulation 
model with random-coefficients logit demand to two mergers in the ready-to- 
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eat (RTE) cereal industry
40 and calculated the cost efficiencies necessary to 
compensate the price effect. Using post-merger data, he was able to partially 
evaluate the performance of the model and the sensitivity to different assump-
tions. In general, the model’s predictions are fairly close to the actual outcomes 
suggesting that simulation is potentially useful. However, due to a lack of de-
tailed post-merger data his statement is based on an informal analysis instead of 
formal tests. Besides, other dimensions of non-price competition between cereal 
producers like strategic decisions concerning advertising or new brand intro-
duction could have had a direct, maybe countervailing influence on prices as 
well.   
 
A second study conducted by Pinske & Slade (2004) deals with two mergers in 
the UK brewing industry in 1995.
41 They used a semiparametric continuous-
choice specification which combines the simplicity of logit and nested logit 
demand with the flexibility of random coefficients models. Marginal costs were 
not inferred from Nash-Bertrand equilibrium but obtained from a detailed engi-
neering study of beer-production, distribution and retailing costs. In summary, 
their findings show that their model was able to produce price effects that 
closely matched reality despite neglecting several aspects of firms’ behaviour. 
Furthermore, the results supported the case decision of the British antitrust au-
thority.  
 
Peters (2006) predicted the price effects for five different U.S. airline mergers 
that have been completed between 1986 and 1987 and compared them to ob-
served post-merger prices. He employed a rich publicly available dataset and 
estimated both a nested logit model and a generalized extreme value (GEV) 
                                                            
40   These were the 1993 merger of Kraft Foods and RJR Nabisco as well as the acquisition of Ralston 
Purina’s cereal brand Chex by General Mills in 1996.  
41   The merger of Courage/Scottish and Newcastle was allowed in 1995, while the one between 
Bass/Carlsberg and Tetley was eventually prohibited in 1997. Therefore, their simulation using 1995 
data concerned two scenarios: (i) undoing the Scottish/Newcastle merger and (ii) forecasting the ef-
fect of the Bass/Carlsberg and Tetley merger.  
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model.
42 Comparing his simulation results to actual price increases,
43 he con-
cluded that the predicted increases of the GEV are closer to the observed 
changes than those of the nested logit. However, even the GEV only modestly 
predicted the real changes. In result, Peters’ analysis did not prove merger 
simulation to be able to closely predict price changes due to mergers in the air-
line industry. However, merger simulation might be ill suited to the airline in-
dustry in general as the pricing cannot be described appropriately by any sta-
tionary oligopoly model employable in simulation (Werden et al. 2004: 1; Pe-
ters 2006: 629).  
 
In summary, very few studies exist and they produce rather mixed results. From 
this, Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008: 36) conclude: “it seems that the evaluation 
of merger simulation models by a comparison of predicted and actual outcomes 
is in its infancy. In view of the extensive use to which these models are put, a 
careful evaluation of their effectiveness seems long over due.” Taken seriously, 
this would imply a more cautious approach towards basing real merger control 
decisions on simulation results until more ex post evaluations of the perform-
ance of MSMs are available. 
 
For instance, a field study along the following lines would be of particular value 
for practical merger control policy. A systematic testing of the tool MSM could 
be done by using real world experiments or tournaments. Several experts are 
asked to submit a MSM for a specific real merger case in a certain market 
(without employing them in the merger control decision). Then, the actual per-
formance of the post-merger market serves as the benchmark for the submitted 
predictions. Despite being somewhat elaborate and expensive, such tourna-
ments would be likely to produce important theoretical and practical insights, 
                                                            
42   This model is a generalization of the nested logit that permits substitution to depend on multiple dis-
crete characteristics. For details see Bresnahan et al. (1997).  
43   As some portion of the observed price change is assumed to be caused by other exogenous forces, 
like inflation, fluctuations in the fuel price, etc., the author calculated a relative price change as the 
difference between observed percentage price change and an average industry-wide percentage price 
change across all markets.  
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last but not least because of the inherent competitive character. They might be 
even superior to such ex post analysis that, in hindsight, attempts to reproduce 
actual market development (pseudo predictions). In contrast to such – doubt-
lessly valuable – ‘hindsight simulations’, the ‘tournament simulations’ would 
entail real lack of knowledge about future market development at the time of 
simulation (real predictions), thereby enhancing the explanatory power of the 
performance test. 
5.  Conclusions 
Advances in competition economics as well as in computational and empirical 
methods have offered the scope for the employment of MSM in merger control 
procedures during the past almost 15 years. Merger simulation is, nevertheless, 
still a very young and innovative instrument of antitrust and, therefore, (i) its 
‘technical’ potential is far from being comprehensively exploited and (ii) teeth-
ing problems in its practical use in antitrust prevail. We provide a classification 
of state-of-the-art MSM and review their previous employment in merger cases 
as well as the problems and limitations currently associated with its use in 
merger control. In summary, MSM represent an important and valuable exten-
sion of the toolbox of merger policy. However, they do not qualify as a magic 
bullet and must be combined with other, more traditional instruments of compe-
tition policy in order to comprehensively unfold its beneficial effects. Next to 
providing even more detailed and complex models, further research should fo-
cus on the reliability of predictions from MSMs, for instance through ex post 
studies or (experimental) field studies.  
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